MOBY-DICK: THE READER AND THE ACT OF COGNITION

Bryce Conrad
En Ro u t e T o board the packet schooner for Nantucket, Queequeg recalls his first encounter with a wheelbarrow. Not com prehending the unfamiliar object's function, he tied his sea chest to it and then proceeded to hoist the entire affair onto his shoulders for transport. Ishm ael's incredulous reaction to the story m ight well be that o f any "civilized" man: "Queequeg, you might have known better than that, one would think. Didn't people laugh?" 1 The reply to Ishm ael's query comes in the form o f another tale-this time one about a sea captain who attended a wedding feast on Queequeg's native island o f Kokovoko. Unfamiliar with the particular dining protocol o f his hosts, the visitor decided to take his lead from the island king who dipped his fingertips into a large bowl o f liquid which had been placed before the assembled company. The captain surmised that the king's actions m eant washing was in order before the meal, and he proceeded to bathe his hands in what turned out to be a cerem onial wedding beverage freshly consecrated by the king's fingers. Q ueequeg pointedly returns Ishm ael's question: "Now. . .what do you tink now ?-Didn't our people laugh?" (p. 59). Ishmael does not respond. The reader is left to ponder for himself w hether Queequeg's people laughed or not at witnessing an act probably no less strange to them than a m an carrying a loaded wheelbarrow on his back would be to Ishmael. Yet certainly som ething m ore instructive emerges from the juxtaposition o f these two tales than a brief lesson in comparative anthropology. For if Q ueequeg "might have known better" than to lift a wheelbarrow onto his back, by w hat cognitive process could he arrive at such knowledge? Is there som ething in the wheelbarrow itself which makes Queequeg's use of the object "less correct" than civilized m an 's? Even if one assumes that the w heelbarrow 's m aker constructed the object to possess a particular function and that all other uses to which it might be put are merely interpretive "mistakes," can one in turn also posit a heuristic com ponent in the object which will ensure that the m aker's purpose is fulfilled? W hat is to prohibit the individual-as in the case o f the sea captain-from interpret ing the significance o f an unfamiliar object or phenom enon within a range o f possibilities determ ined by the norm s o f his familiar experience and knowledge? O ne may view the problem as purely anthropological if the thing or event in question belongs to the ordinary experiential world of one group o f people or another. Yet Moby-Dick concerns not only wheelbarrows on the docks o f New Bedford and ceremonial practices am ong primitive societies, but "the interlinked terrors and wonders o f G od" (p. 99) which one encounters on "the unhooped oceans o f this planet" (p. 171).
The whaling vessel provides the prim ary instrum entality for shifting these speculative questions to an epistemological level: "For m any years past the whale-ship has been the pioneer in ferreting out the rem otest and least known parts o f the earth. She has explored seas and archipelagoes which had no chart" (p. 99) and penetrated "into the rem otest secret drawers and lockers o f the w orld" (p. 382). Furtherm ore, the ship sets forth the paradigm o f obtaining "value" by voyaging into the unknow n-the encounter with leviathan contains a prom ise o f distilling his "essence" in a tangible and m aterial form. Yet the whaling ship, unlike the cognizing minds o f some o f her crew m em bers, sails on the premise o f reducing whatever is unfamiliar in the whale to a familiar m onetary value: ". . .for however peculiar . . . any chance whale may be, they soon put an end to his peculiarities by killing him, and boiling him down into a peculiarly valuable oil" (p. 176)-and that "peculiarly valuable oil" is defined as such only within the context o f the Nantucket m arket and the lamps o f the world.
Thus the w halem en themselves-unless, like Flask, they accept the "val ues" o f the Nantucket m arket with such assurance that they look upon leviathan as "but a species o f magnified m ouse" (p. 106)-may not be so guided in their probing o f the unknown, for "o f all sailors, they are by all odds the m ost directly brought into contact with whatever is appallingly astonishing in the sea; face to face they not only eye its greatest marvels, but, hand to jaw, give battle to them " (p. 156). Certainly neither Ishmael nor Ahab restricts his attem pts to discover the significance and im port o f the unknow n to the context provided by the Nantucket whaling market. H ow ever, the paradoxical proposition o f desiring to "know " what is "unknow n" -as the "W heelbarrow " chapter has pointed o u t-presents no clear guidelines. Ahab may accost the whale him self with "Speak, thou vast and venerable head" (p. 264), but "not one syllable" does it utter. Ishmael may concede the "pyramidical silence" (p. 264) o f the whale and endeavor to exam ine him anatomically piece by piece, but he finally declares, "Dissect him how I may, then, I go but skin deep; I know him not, and never will" (p. 318). Yet the inscrutability o f the visible and the sensory leads Ahab to proclaim that "All visible objects, m an, are but pasteboard masks. But in each event-in the living act, the undoubted deed-there, some unknown but still reasoning thing puts forth the moldings o f its features from behind the unreasoning mask. If m an will strike, strike through the mask!" (p. 144).
Ahab, however, cannot avoid admitting, "Sometimes I think there's naught beyond" (p. 144). And even Ishmael reveals a desire to verify what m ight lie "beyond" when he longs to "leap the topm ost skies, to see w hether the fabled heavens with all their countless tents really lie encam ped beyond my m ortal sight!" (p. 233).
For the reader o f Moby-Dick, the novel's overwhelming interpretive difficul ties reside in the fact that knowing the unknow n becomes as much his problem as it does any particular character's. The mysterious objects and phenom ena encountered in reading the text-w hether Queequeg's tattoos, the nightly spouting o f a unseen sea creature, or the white whale himselfare not defined by the characters for the reader, but rem ain resonant symbols by which the characters themselves are partially defined. "The D oubloon" chapter offers the m ost explicit example. Ishmael wryly intro duces that section with his observation that "some certain significance lurks in all things, else all things are w orth little, and the round world itself is but an em pty cipher, except to sell by the cartload, as they do in hills about Boston, to fill up some morass in the Milky W ay" (p. 358). Then, in succes sion, Ahab, Starbuck, Stubb, Flask, the M anxm an, and Pip attem pt to discov er "some certain significance" in the doubloon-six varied readings o f the coin, yet as Stubb comments, "but still one text" (p. 362). The significance o f the doubloon itself, however, rem ains the openness o f possibility by virtue o f each interpreter supplying his ow n subjective and "self-reflecting" context in order to effect his act o f cognition. Ahab places the coin in the context o f his quest to find "W ho's over m e?" (p. 144): "The firm tower, that is Ahab; the volcano, that is Ahab; the courageous, the undaunted, and the victorious fowl, that, too, is Ahab; all are Ahab; and this round gold is but the image o f the rounder globe, which like a m agician's glass, to each and every m an in turn m irrors back his own mysterious s e lf' (p. 359). The world "mirrors back" A hab's "own mysterious s e lf' because only through that self can he perceive the world-thus objects becom e opaque masks which admit not o f the "beyond" unless one can "strike through the m ask." The doubloon serves, in part, to reveal Ahab to the reader, just as it reveals Flask and his Nantucket m arket context: "I see nothing here, but a round thing made o f gold, and whoever raises a certain whale, this round thing belongs to him. So w hat's all this staring about? It is w orth sixteen dollars, th a t's true; and at two cents the cigar, th at's nine hundred and sixty cigars" (p. 361). Stubb's attem pt "at raising a m eaning out o f these queer curvicues here with the Massachusetts calendar" (p. 361) provokes the m ost telling com m ent on the act o f reading or cognizing the significance in things: "Book! you lie there; the fact is, you books m ust know your places. You'll do to give us the bare words and facts, but we come in to supply the thoughts" (pp. 360-61). He might as aptly have stated that we come in to supply the context. "I look, you look, he looks; we look, ye look, they look," (p. 362) says Pip. The reader, too, might try his hand "at raising a m eaning" from the dou-bloon o r the " b o o k " o f Moby-Dick, yet no final "objective" or stable interpretation can em erge from the novel itself because its contextual fram e w ork or border is, paradoxically, unfram ed and borderless. The Pequod takes the reader away from "safety, comfort, hearthstone, supper, warm blankets, friends, all th at's kind to our m ortalities" (p. 97), and into a "howling infinite" o f "unshored, harborless imm ensities" (p. 116). Within such an unlimited vastness, the symbolic possibilities o f objects and events retain a plurality undim inished in its potential by any specific context necessarily im posed upon them by the characters or reader in the act o f cognition-for without a context, cognition rem ains impossible. In his The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Ernst Cassirer points out that "Every 'simple' quality o f consciousness has a definite content only in so far as it is apprehended in com plete unity with certain qualities but separately from others. The func tion o f this unity and this separation is not rem ovable from the content of consciousness but constitutes one o f its essential conditions."2 Cassirer's thinking here bears obvious affinities with Ishm ael's assertion that "there is no quality in this world that is not what it is merely by contrast. Nothing exists in itself' (p. 55). And it is precisely this dependence o f content on context which reveals the full extent o f the read er's difficult position in attem pting to grasp the symbolic elements o f the text. For the novel often thw arts the reader's facile interpretations by showing that the contexts provided by m an are invariably extensions o f his familiar and habitual knowledge. Q ueequeg's juxtaposed tales dem onstrate that a w heelbarrow divorced from its familiar context resonates with as m uch symbolic possibility as an isolated hieroglyph. And w ithout the familiar context of hand-washing be fore a meal, the king o f Kokovoko dipping his fingers into the ceremonial bowl would appear as suggestively luminous as the "mystic gestures" which Ishmael associates with the whale's tail: ". . .1 have heard hunters who have declared them akin to Free-Mason signs and symbols; that the whale, indeed, by these m ethods intelligently conversed with the w orld" (p. 317). Further m ore, the novel's non-verification o f any governing context in the universe at large raises the som ewhat staggering consideration-implicit, however, in Moby-Dick-that all objects, events, motions, and phenom ena may be innately symbolic and that the entire cosmos itself exists, like the novel, as a text o f unfathom able pluralities. In a sense, Moby-Dick has taken the logical simplicities of late eighteenth-and early nineteenth-century natural theology with its teleological argum ents for the existence o f God, and has turned those simplicities into cognitive and metaphysical complexities. The grand scope o f such an idea naturally induces speculation about the existence o f a suprem e context-w hether Plato's realm o f unchangeable forms, Kant's absolute being, or an om nipotent deity-which would enable m an to posit the likelihood o f a single m eaning for things rather than to inhabit a world o f symbolic pluralities. And within the textual world of the novel, few critics 94 and readers have not speculated on the possible existence o f a key or code which would render one stable m eaning from Moby-Dick.
Yet unless the reader approaches the text with an already delineated value he wishes to extract-as the whaling vessel ostensibly goes to sea for a particular "value"-he m ust depend upon the novel itself to set out some kind o f interpretive restraints. Carey H. Kirk comments, "In m any respects, the novel's audience cannot react to it at all without being attracted and guided by the opposition betw een Ahab and Ishmael. These alternatives provide one o f the few fences around an unm anageably expansive book and do set some limits on potential chaos."3 O ne might, however, challenge the validity o f such a "fence" on the grounds that it implicitly assumes an oppostion between A hab's and Ishm ael's view o f the world which primarily finds interpretive articulation in a piecing together o f the epistemological theories that would seem to inform the thoughts and behavior o f the two. Robert Zoellner's study o f the novel is founded upon such a piecing together o f A hab's and Ishmael's implied theories o f cognition: ". . .the difference betw een Ahab, the dramatic expositor o f Moby-Dick and Ishmael, the n arra tive expositor, is epistemological. They do not agree on the relationship betw een perceiver and perceived. This disagreem ent lies at the root o f Moby-Dick. If Ahab is right, then Ishmael is wrong; if Ishmael is right, then Ahab is w rong."4 Yet Zoellner's rigorous application o f this "disagreem ent" proves to be m ore o f a critical construct than an interpretive border provid ed by the novel when he subsequently elevates Ishm ael's "scientifically correct analysis o f perception" at the expense o f A hab's "grossness o f realization" which "sees only ugliness and malice in life" (Zoellner, pp. 26, 108, 115) .
A similar approach is to define the luminous symbolism o f Moby-Dick by contrasting it with the em blematic stasis o f allegory, and hence to draw the distinction, as does W alter E. Bezanson, that Ishmael accepts a vision o f symbolic potential while A hab's "destruction follows when he substitutes an allegorical fixation for the world o f symbolic potentialities."5 But here Bezan son seems, quite contradictorily, to posit for him self some governing force in the universe which metes out destruction for that act o f allegorization on A hab's part. Furtherm ore, to allegorize the world, one m ust know the absolute context which defines the emblematic m eaning o f objects and events-in this respect, Ahab does not allegorize the world but rather directs all his energy toward discovering w hether the world is allegorical, indeed w hether there is a suprem e context. The distinction presents no m ere critical quibble if one insists on establishing Ahab and Ishmael as the borders for the reader's responses to Moby-Dick. The often voiced critical claim that Ahab imperiously decides that whatever lies "beyond" m ust be "Evil," fails to take into account A hab's own admission that there may be "naught beyond," and that Ahab circularly defines "Evil" as whatever is "beyond" and unseen. As his "complete m an after a desireable pattern " (p. 390) indicates, Ahab dem ands the capability to know rather than proclaims his capacity for knowledge:
Imprimis, fifty feet high in his socks; then, a chest modelled after the Thames Tunnel; then, legs with root to 'em, to stay in one place; then, arms three feet through the wrist; no heart at all, brass forehead, and about a quarter o f an acre o f fine brains; and let me see-shall I order eyes to see outwards? No, but put a sky light on the top o f his head to illuminate inwards, (p. 390)
Ideally, Ahab rejects his own eyes, which can only gaze upon the "paste board masks" o f the sensory w orld-he wants a window toward the cosmos in order to be illuminated "inw ards" concerning an absolute context and a m eaning o f things. Ultimately, he suffers from his incapacity for knowl edge. Suggestive but inscrutable symbols such as Q ueequeg's hieroglyphic tattoos present a "devilish tantalization o f the gods" (p. 399). Since Ahab cannot know their m eaning is precisely why he so vehemently deprecates against all omens, dim intimations, and vague intuitions o f "tru th ": "If the gods think to speak outright to man, they will honorably speak outright; not shake their heads, and give an old wives' darkling hint" (p. 452). A hab's defiance is, finally, defiance o f inscrutability, o f "the dead blind wall" which "butts all enquiring heads at last" (p. 427). Yet Ishmael also examines the whale and finds "a dead blind wall" (p. 284). He posits at one point a "clear T ru th " inaccessible to man, "a thing for salam ander giants only to encoun ter" (p. 286). Ishmael may even succumb to a certain type o f "m onom a nia"-or m ore properly, "m onophobia"-which manifests itself not in a physical assault on "the unseen thing," but in his feeling that it will inevitably rem ain "unseen" and inaccessible for those who seek it:
Were this world an endless plain, and by sailing eastward we could for ever reach new distances, and discover sights more sweet and strange than any Cyclades or Islands o f King Solomon, then there were promise in the voyage. But in the pursuit o f those far mysteries we dream of, or in tormented chase o f that demon phantom that, some time or other, swims before all human hearts; while chasing such over this round globe, they either lead us on in barren mazes or midway leave us whelmed, (p. 204)
The statem ent m ay well serve as a m etaphor for the reader's own cogni tive chase of a m eaning in Moby-Dick. And what provides an interpretive border for that chase is not any philosophical program or epistemological theory which either Ishmael o r Ahab em bodies for the reader, but the actual process by which the reader attem pts to assemble a meaning for the textfor the reading o f Moby-Dick constitutes the sole cognitive act in which the reader is engaged. At the m ost basic ontological level, the novel is simply an assemblage o f words w ritten or compiled fo r the reader. Here one m ust consider Ishmael not only as character, but also as n arrator-for in this latter role he becomes, as A. Robert Lee suggests, a type o f "m onkey-rope" com panion for the reader who would otherwise find himself hopelessly adrift am ong "the constituents o f a chaos" (p. 117).6 With the opening sen tence o f the "Loomings" chapter-"Call m e Ishm ael"-the narrator estab-lishes his prerogative to give instructions while the reader's continued read ing o f the text implies compliance with or fulfillment o f those instructions. This dynamic interaction betw een n arrato r and reader immediately defines the two as mutually d ependent-they are united by a "Siamese ligature" not unlike that which binds Ishmael and Queequeg in "The Monkey-Rope" chapter: "I seemed distinctly to perceive that my own individuality was now m erged in a joint stock com pany o f two. . . . N or could I possibly forget that, do what I would, I had only the m anagem ent of one end o f it" (p. 271). Ishmael certainly does not forget-indeed, it would be difficult to find a n arrator who evinces m ore care in m anipulating his end o f the line. Paradox ically, however, Ishmael's overt instructions to the reader seem to promise the imm anence o f a m eaning rather than its absence. As Warwick Wadlington notes, Ishm ael's language gives rise to "the cognitive impulse, the desire to obtain final answers from an alluring world that stimulates interpreta tion."7 Ishmael repeatedly com m ands the reader to look upon what appears to be puzzling and inexplicable, questions him as to its significance, and then delivers an explanatory statement: Ishmael does not abandon the reader after this barrage o f grammatical imperatives and queries have been directed at him, but offers an interpreta tion in the guise o f an answer: "Yes, as every one knows, m editation and w ater are wedded for ever" (p. 13). After another round of questions for the reader, Ishmael concludes with the story o f Narcissus, explicitly proffering it as "the image o f the ungraspable phantom o f life" and "the key to it all" (p. 14). If the reader senses some duplicity on the n arrato r's part in linking "the key to it all" with an "ungraspable p hantom ," Ishmael allays rather than exacerbates those incipient suspicions by involving him in an investiga tion o f Ishmael's own motives for signing aboard a whaling ship rather than undertaking the accustomed voyage with the m erchant service. He claims to "see a little into the springs and motives" and reveals that "one grand hooded phantom , like a snow hill in the air" had its place am ong "the wild conceits" which urged him on (p. 16). Yet in the implicit link betw een Ishm ael's "one grand hooded p h antom " and "the ungraspable phantom " which he intimates is "the key to it all," Ishmael has attem pted to sway the reader to his narrative purpose. The phantom-like image which the reader will pursue in the ensuing pages has been equated with the phantom-like image which the narrator will pursue in writing about his own past experi " That"-the key which w hen "found o u t" resolves all other levels of inscrutability in the picture "and all the rest were plain"-turns out to be "even the great leviathan h im self' (p. 20). The cognitive hunt is on, yet a full seventy chapters pass before "leviathan h im self' can be physically appre hended and Ishmael may finally rejoin the reader to "lay together o u r" heads (p. 278) in order to exam ine this portentous "that" in detail. And during that interim, leviathan has literally assum ed the status o f an inaccessi ble phantom for both Ishmael and the reader. Although Ishmael endeavors "to take hold o f whales bodily, in their entire liberal volume, and boldly sort them that way" (p. 123) in the "Cetology" chapter, he reminds the reader that in this approach to leviathan, "It is chiefly with his nam e that I now have to d o " (p. 120). In the first attem pt to capture the living creature, the "fictitious m onster" (p. 193) not only eludes Ishm ael's grasp, but his sight as well-the boat is swamped by the unseen flukes and a rising sea, leaving Queequeg to try and signal the ship with a lantern on a waif-pole: "There, then, he sat, holding up that imbecile candle in the heart o f that almighty forlom ness. There, then, he sat, the sign and symbol o f a m an without faith, hopelessly holding up hope in the m idst o f despair" (p. 195). The reader may well begin w ondering w hether the involuntary "oath " which Ishmael ex tracted from him in the Spouter-Inn has put him on the trail o f a fact or fiction. Indeed, Ishmael returns to the m edium o f paint in the "O f the M onstrous Pictures o f W hales" chapter, but of the various representations o f the whale he shows the reader, "none can hit it with any very considerable degree o f exactness" (p. 228). Ishm ael's concluding advice to the reader does n ot appear too heartening: Ishmael initially bespeaks all the assurances o f an accomplished anato mist. He remains undaunted by the prelim inary difficulties encountered in explicating what seems beyond com prehension, willing to consider certain unverifiable suppositions m erely because they have "the savor o f analogical probability" (p. 282). At one point he recapitulates his findings for the reader by stopping "to sum u p " (p. 283). But in "The Battering-Ram" chapter, Ishm ael's quasi-scientific discourse breaks down. Abandoning the relatively stable ground o f com parative anatom y, he also leaves behind the factually rooted yet cursory observations on the physical structure o f leviathan in order to probe the sperm w hale's m ore perplexing peculiarities. Ishmael avers that "the Sperm W hale's head is a dead, blind wall. . ." (p. 284) "inesti mable by any m an who has not handled it" (p. 285). And while he still makes reference to what "has hypothetically occurred to m e" (p. 285), words such as "inexplicable," "mystical," and "unknow n" find their places once again in Ishm ael's language. He openly admonishes the reader by stating, "when I shall show you some o f his m ore inconsiderable braining feats; I trust you will have renounced all ignorant incredulity, and be ready to abide by this; that though the Sperm Whale stove a passage through the Isthmus o f Darien, and mixed the Atlantic with the Pacific, you would not elevate one hair of your eye brow " (p. 285). The thrust seems clear-lessons in "practical cetology" have but a limited application. They provide little m ore than a tentative and superficial grid for gauging the mysteries o f a creature who has "no nose, eyes, ears, or m outh; no face; he has none proper; nothing but that one broad firm am ent o f a forehead, pleated with riddles" (p. 292). Certainly Ishmael is not insensitive to the straits in which this abrupt change in tone leaves his "m onkey-rope" com panion. In his indecisiveness over the nature o f the w hale's spout, Ishmael takes the read er's role for a m om ent to answer the obvious com plaint that the orderly empiricism o f "practical cetology" has collasped: Finally Ishmael confesses, "Dissect him how I may, then, I go but skin deep; I know him not, and never will" (p. 318). Despite all the cognitive "cutting-in" and "trying-out," the whale escapes unscathed. In the last o f the o s te n s ib le c e to lo g ic a l m e d ita tio n s -th e " W ill He P e ris h ? " c h a p ter-leviathan swims away, still all o f a piece, inscrutable, mysterious, and indom itable, spouting "his frothed defiance to the skies" (p. 385). If the reader recalls the painting in the Spouter-Inn, he cannot but realize "that" has not been "found o u t" and "all the rest" is not "plain." Yet Ishmael by no m eans wantonly severs the "m onkey-rope" no r forces a gullible reader to thread his own way through the uncertainties o f the novel's final pages. For while Ishmael leads the reader on in a search for a meaning, he also makes the reader aware why one m eaning is not forthcoming and why "your plain things" m ay be "the knottiest o f all." In a sense, Ishm ael's overt instructions to the reader merely serve as a disguise for a series o f covert instructions which are designed to m ake the reader aware that he is engaged in the act o f cognition, i.e., the act o f reading and "raising a m eaning" from Moby-Dick. Rather than prescribing a theory o f epistemology, Ishmael con sistently points out the limits o f on e's habitual and familiar knowledge as a basis for cognition. His narrative m ethod in this respect has already been suggested in the "W heelbarrow " chapter. Ishmael anticipates the reader's reaction to Q ueequeg's shouldering o f the wheelbarrow by com m enting "you m ight have known better than that, one would think" (p. 59), and thereby puts the reader in the position o f receiving Queequeg's rejoinder. The effect is clear-the reader, like the "civilized" sea captain who visits Kokovoko, interprets w hat is unfam iliar by making it familiar.
Throughout the chapters in which he relates his initial meeting with Queequeg, Ishmael uses him self to illustrate the discrepancy between on e's familiar sphere o f knowledge and the unfamiliar. While awaiting his har-p ooner's arrival in the bedroom at the Spouter-Inn, he seizes upon a peculiar item: "I took it up, and held it close to the light, and felt it, and smelt it, and tried every way possible to arrive at some satisfactory conclusion concerning it. I can com pare it to nothing but a large doo rm at" (p. 27). The object does not yield its mystery to Ishm ael's visual, tactile, and olfactory probings-it cannot be com prehended w ithout recourse to an analogy with the familiar "doorm at," which, as Ishmael fails not to rem ind the reader, provides no adequate explanation either: "But could it be possible that any sober harpooner would get into a doorm at, and parade the streets o f any Christian town in that sort o f guise?" (p. 27). Queequeg him self presents no less a m ystery upon entering the room . The absurdly jocular tone in Ishm ael's description o f Queequeg as a m an with "a mildewed skull . . . a stickingplaster shirt" and "legs. . .m arked, as if a parcel o f dark green frogs were running up the trunks o f young palm s" (p. 29), simply points out the distor tion inherent in perceiving the unfam iliar in terms o f such familiarities. W hen Queequeg clambers under the bed in order to put his boots on, Ishmael rem arks that "by no law o f propriety that I ever heard of, is any m an required to be private w hen putting on his boots" (p. 34). Queequeg perform s "some sort o f Lent o r Ram adan, o r day o f fasting, humiliation and prayer," and Ishmael observes that "how" it was I could never find out, for, though I applied myself to it several times, I could never m aster his liturgies and XXXIX Articles" (p. 66). In such passages Ishmael covertly urges the reader to become aware o f the inefficacy that his own "laws o f propriety" and "XXXIX Articles"-his habitually ingrained reality-will have in the pages ahead. For the problem o f interpreting the unfamiliar does not find expression only in the contrast betw een "civilized" and "savage" man. Nor does Ishmael hesitate to inform the reader why an awareness o f his habitual reality will prove necessary for the act o f reading the novel: that the whaling ship itself-which Ishmael appropriately calls "my Yale College and m y H arvard" (p. 101)-provides not only an introductory course in "the mysteries of whaling" (p. 58), but also a m eans o f awakening the reader to his "landed" perspective. The perception o f the world by a "whale m a n " and a "landsm an" m ay differ as much as betw een "savage" and "civilized" man. The familiar and the unfamiliar as defined by the habitual experiences o f each group may even be mutually exclusive, because "for years he (the whaleman) knows not the land; so that when he comes to it at last, it smells like another world, m ore strangely than the m oon would to an Earthsm an" (p. 63). In this light, Ishm ael's leading o f the reader from the mysteries o f Queequeg to "the mysteries o f whaling" is not at all incon gruous: "Long exile from Christendom and civilization inevitably restores m an to that condition in which God placed him, i.e. what is called savagery. Your whale-hunter is as much a savage as an Iroquois" (p. 232).
Certainly much o f the specialized vocabulary and actual workings o f the whaling ship explained by Ishmael form a part of the reader's whaling education. In several chapters, such as "The Line," Ishmael indeed tells the reader that such explanations serve "for the better understanding of all similar scenes elsewhere presented" (p. 238). The reading o f Moby-Dick, however, will not make one a whalem an any m ore than it will give him the "double" eyesight o f the sperm whale, and Ishm ael's use o f the whaleman as som eone who has been "forced into familiarity" (p. 158) with the unfamil iar functions primarily as a tool to dislodge the read er's habitual context o f "landedness" as a cognitive foundation. Such sights as "in m ountainous countries. . .the profiles o f whales defined along the undulating ridges" are visible only to "a thorough w halem an" (p. 233), and in other passages Ishmael further reinforces the assertion that the landsm an remains blind to certain phenom ena:
As the three boats lay there on that gently rolling sea, gazing down into its eternal blue noon; and as not a single groan or cry o f any sort, nay, not so much as a ripple or a bubble came up from its depths; what landsman would have thought, that beneath all that silence and placidity, the utmost monster o f the seas was writhing and wrenching in agony! (p. 300) Nevertheless, the experim ental world o f the whaleman does not posit for the reader a context through which the significance of things may be per ceived. In a qualification o f his com parison o f the whaleman to a savage, Ishmael claims, "I m yself am a savage, owning no allegiance but to the King o f the Cannibals; and ready at any m om ent to rebel against him " (p. 232). The m etaphor indicates that Ishmael not only rejects adopting any single contextual perspective, but also proposes no single context to the reader, for to do so would necessarily place interpretive borders on the symbolic potential o f objects and phenom ena. The use o f the "whaling" world as opposed to the "landed" world is, m ore properly, a device by which Ishmael creates for the reader a state o f utter "landlessness," a state in which the "harborless immensities" o f the sea itself can suggest an essentially fluid contextual horizon that reveals the symbolic plurality of things through a perpetually shifting "illumining" background: Thus Ishmael displays particular care in pointing out that his own experi ences o f an insight into the nature o f things are inextricably tied to a specific though fleeting and transient set o f perceptual conditions, and that such insights do not represent purely transcendental m om ents which exist on the level o f a "thing in itself." His rem arks on the workings of "chance, free will, and necessity" in "The Mat-Maker" chapter, for example, cannot be di vorced from his prefatory rem arks on how that perception came about: "I say so strange a dreaminess did there then reign all over the ship and all over the sea, only broken by the interm itting dull sound o f the sword, that it seemed as if this were the Loom o f Tim e" (italics mine, p. 185). Likewise, Ishm ael's vision o f "long rows o f angels in paradise, each with his hands in a ja r o f sperm aceti," in the "A Squeeze o f the H and" chapter, rem ains firmly rooted in the tem porary concatenation o f several factors: In these "mingled, mingling threads o f life" Ishmael weaves a narrative which simultaneously feeds and denies the read er's cognitive impulse. Not only is the world landless in its ceaseless change and transform ation, but m an is also landless in that he does no t constitute a stable being in his tem poral existence. With both perceiver and perceived in constant "m o tion," the ontological verification o f an all-subsuming context through which an absolute act o f cognition m ay be effected can become both a "m onom a nia" and a "m onophobia." For the reader that quest is endless-he m ust "trace the round again"-because, like Ishm ael's narrative, the quest is circular. In the tem porality o f the reading process he does "not advance through fixed gradations, and at the last one pause," but rather reaches the "Epilogue" in which the quotation from the Book o f Job leads him back to the telling o f the tale, that is, the "beginning" o f Moby-Dick. The implied circularity o f the narrative serves as a m etaphor for the reader's textual experience o f cognitive landlessness, as the form itself precludes one's ability to select a specific part o f the circle which embodies the experience o f circularity m ore than another part. Ishmael creates a verbal structure de signed to give the reader the experience in language o f "that mortally intolerable tru th " that "in landlessness alone resides the highest truth, shore less, indefinite as G od" (p. 97). Yet only by engaging the reader's cognitive impulse can Ishmael lead him to glimpse "the highest tru th " which is b e yond cognition, just as only by engaging the reader's habitual experiental context can Ishmael reveal that the context for Moby-Dick is no context. The novel cannot, therefore, be interpreted in the sense o f nam ing or identifying m eaning-it exists only to be experienced by the reader in the act of reading. And that experience is guided by the dynamic interaction between Ishmael and the reader as well as by the dialectical interplay o f the cognitive drive and its impossibility o f fulfillment-contrary pressures which exert a force on the reader's m ovem ent through the text like the contradictory winds that move the Perquod in "The Spirit-Spout" chapter: ". . .she rushed along, as if two antagonistic influences were struggling in her-one to m ount direct to heaven, the other to drive yawingly to some horizontal goal" (p. 200). In this dialectic the novel achieves its peculiar parity and commensurability with "the ungraspable p h antom " which it ostensibly fails to capture-Moby-Dick itself becomes the phantom for the reader.
